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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and Christie, Inc. dba Taco Time (hereinafter "Taco Time")
filed this lawsuit against Defendant-Respondent Leishman Electric, Inc. (hereinafter "Leishman
Electric") to recover damages arising kom a fire at its Rexburg location on June 9,2004. This
lawsuit was filed after Taco Time settled for 50% of its damages with Sign Pro, Inc. (hereinafter
"Sign Pro") in another lawsuit. This lawsuit against Leishman Electric was dismissed when the
trial court granted summary judgment holding that Taco Time's negligence claims were barred
by the economic loss rule. It is from this order dismissing the case against Leishman Electric that
Taco Time appeals.

The Course of the Proceedings Below
In early 2006 Taco Time sued Sign Pro, Leishman Electric and others in a different
lawsuit. R. Vol. I, p. 63 Almost immediately after filing this lawsuit Taco Time and its
attorneys "decided at that point to focus our attention on Sign Pro of Southeast Idaho, Inc., and
discontinue our pursuit of the other defendants at that time." R. Vol. I, p. 60 An Amended
Complaint was filed by Taco Time naming only Sign Pro as the party defendant. R. Vol. I, p. 65
The strategy resulted in recovery of "50% of the total damages and prejudgment interest." R.
Val. I, p. 60
On October 2,2006, Taco Time filed this lawsuit naming Leishman Electric as the party
defendant and sought to recover the remaining 50% of its alleged damages. R. Vol. I, pp. 9 and
14 at 77 30 and 3 1 After some initial discovery Leishman Electric moved for summary
judgment on June 5,2007, contending that the statute of limitations, res judicata and/or collateral
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estoppel and the economic loss rule barred Taco Time's Complaint against Leishman Electric.
The trial court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. The trial court held that the
economic loss rule applied but did not completely bar Taco Time's claims. R. Vol. I, p. 98
After additional discovery, Taco Time moved for summary judgment on April 10,2008,
contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact about the negligence of Leishman
Electric or the damages to which Taco Time was entitled. On that basis Taco Time sought
judgment as a matter of law for damages in the amount of $146,868.04 and pre-judgment interest
of $70,496.66 for a total of $217,364.70. R. Vol. I, pp.104 and 141 The trial court denied Taco
Time's motion:
Plaintiffs move the Court to grant summary judgment on their negligence
action against Leishman Electric. Their motion is premature. Two elements of
their case, causation and damages, have issues of material fact fit for jury
determination. As to causation, several individuals worked on the sign and there
is an issue of fact as to the extent each individual's actions had in the fire's
causation. As to damages, the court has ruled that the Plaintiffs are limited to
non-economic damages; there is an issue of fact as to the amount of those
damages. Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is denied.
R. Vol. 11, p. 283
Taco Time moved for reconsideration "on the grounds and for the reason that Plaintiffs
respectfully submit that the Court's "economic loss" ruling and application is erroneous as a
matter of law given the undisputed facts established by the record in this case." R. Vol. 11, p. 285
With its Motion for Reconsideration, Taco Time also filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint.
The primary amendment it sought was to correct what its lawyers called a "mistake." The
"mistake" was that after two years of litigation against Leishman Electric, Taco Time's lawyers
had decided that Taco Time was not limited to recovering 50% of the damages it claimed to have
suffered, but could instead recover Leishman Electric's proportionate share of the total damages
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proved by Taco Time at trial. R. Vol. 11, pp. 289 and 296 at 77 30 and 31
On October 1,2008, the trial court reconsidered its prior decisions, concluded that its
prior ruling on economic loss "was erroneous because Plaintiffs damage claims do not survive
application of the economic loss rule" and dismissed Plaintiffs complaint against Leishman
Electric. R. Vol. 11, pp. 302 - 304 The Motion to Amend was also denied "as it is also based
strictly on allegations of Defendant's negligence." R. Vol. 11, p. 304
Statement of Facts
At the outset, a point of clarification is in order. Taco Time asserts that the facts it quotes
in its "Statement of Material Facts" at page 6 of its Opening Brief are all "either undisputed
andlor supported by the evidence viewed most favorably to Taco Time as the non-moving party
opposing summaryjudgment." Throughout its Opening Brief, but particularly at pp. 1 - 2,9 - 11
and 13 - 19, Taco Time quotes evidence allegedly supporting its claim of negligence against
Leishman Electric which is, and was, only germane to Taco Time's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Leishman. The Court's denial of Taco Time's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Vol. 11, p. 283) is not at issue here. No appeal was taken from that decision. R. Vol. 11, pp. 343
a t 1 1 and353atTl
The Negligence Case Against Leishman Electric is Disputed
Regarding evidence which allegedly supports Taco Time's claim of negligence against
Leishman Electric, Taco Time is not entitled to have the evidence construed most favorably to it
because Taco Time was the moving party on the Motion for Summary Judgment in which it tried
to obtain summaryjudgment against Leishman Electric on negligence and causation. Although
Leishman Electric does not believe these factual issues are important to determining the
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"economic loss" question, because Taw Time devoted the time and effort to establish negligence
on the part of Leishman Electric, a brief rebuttal is in order.
At the heart of the allegations of negligence against Leishman Electric are the
transformers which were part of the used neon signage which Brian Larsen purchased from a
closed Taco Time restaurant in Nebraska. R. Vol. I, p. 77 at 7 8 A photograph of one of the
transformers is appended to this Brief. (Exhibit "G" to Cooper Second Affidavit attached to
Motion to Augment.) A transformer takes electricity of one voltage and changes it into another
voltage. In the case of the neon transformers which Brian Larsen supplied and Sign Pro
installed, it required two connections on each transformer to operate the neon sign, one on the
primary side a~ldone on the secondary side. Leishman Electric attached the building power to
the primary side of the transformers. R. Vol. I, p. 88 at deposition transcript p. 14, LL 1 - 4
However, to operate the neon signs the transformers also had to be connected to the neon signs.
Michael Packer, the untrained employee of the unlicensed sign contractor which Brian Larsen
hired', made that connection. R. Vol. 11, p. 263 at 7 11 Taco Time repeatedly states that Sign Pro
did not make the "final" coimection, or that Sign Pro did not "energize" the circuit and that
Leishman Electric "connected" the power to the neon sign. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 1,9,

10, 13, 16 and 19) Because it took two connections to energize each neon sign, it can just as
easily be said that Sign Pro made the "final" connection, "energized" the circuit and "connected"
the power to the neon sign. The trial court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed

'Brian Larsen made absolutely no effort to determine Sign Pro's qualifications to do the
repairs to the damaged signs and the installation at the Taco Time facility in Rexburg. R. Vol. I,
p. 56, Answer to Interrogatory No. 19
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which required a jury to apportion negligence and causation between the several actors. R. Vol.

11, p. 283
It is undisputed that the transformers did not have secondary ground fault protection, a
fact which was known to Michael Packer, the untrained employee of the unlicensed sign
contractor which Brian Larsen hired. R. Vol. II,p. 263 at f/ 10 Plaintiff's experts opine that the
fire was caused by a short circuit at a location where one of the neon tubes had broken. R. Vol. 11,
p. 255 Beginning in 1996, the National Electric Code required that transformers used with neon
signs have secondary ground fault protection which would interrupt the power in the event of a
short circuit. R. Vol. 11, p. 229 The remodel which included the installation of the transformer
and signage took place in 1998/1999. Taco Time's claim against Leishman Electric is that if
Leishman Electric had discovered the transformers supplied by Brian Larsen and installed by
Sign Pro were non-compliant with the National Electric Code it could have prevented the fire
which occurred five years later by not making its connection to the transfonner which supplied
power to the neon sign which short circuited. The same can be said of Sign Pro.

In opposition to Taco Time's Motion for Summary Judgment, Paul Moore, an electrical
engineer, submitted the following testimony by affidavit. (Affidavit of Paul Moore attached to
Leishman Electric's Motion to Augment) Although the 1996 NEC required that neon sign
transfonners have secondary ground fault protection, by reason of a delay in approving and
adopting labeling regulations, it was not until after this installation in early 1999 that neon
transformers were required to have a label affixed to the transformer showing that it was
equipped with secondary ground fault protection. Therefore, in early 1999 Leishman Electric
would have had to dismantle the transformer to determine whether it was equipped with
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secondary ground fault protection. The transformers which were supplied by Brian Larsen and
installed by Sign Pro contained labels identifying them for "Luminous Tube" use. The
transformers also contained a UL sticker which identified them as a "gas tube transformer."
"Luminous Tube" and "gas tube" are common terms used to identify "neon lights." The 1996
NEC required that "Transformers and electronic power supplies shall be identified for the use
and shall be listed." (1996 NEC 600-23) This transformer was in compliance with those
requirements when Leishman Electric connected power to the primary side of the transformer.
Paul Moore opined that under the circumstances of this case Leishman Electric was not required
to inspect either the transformer or the neon signs for compliance with the National Electric
Code. (See Affidavit of Paul Moore attached to Leishman Electric's Motion to Augment Record)
The trial court held that "several individuals worked on the sign and there is an issue of fact as to
the extent each individual's actions had in the fire's causation." R. Vol. 11, p. 283
The Critical Evidence Necessary to Decide the Application of the Economic Loss Rule is
Undisputed
1.

When Brian Larsen, one of the owners of Taco Time, decided in 1998 to remodel his
Taco Time in Rexburg, he contracted with an out of state general contractor to do the
remodel. R.Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 7

2.

The general contractor subcontracted with Leishman Electric to do the electrical work. R.
Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 All of the electrical work performed by
Leishman Electric at the Taco Time in Rexburg was performed under its subcontract with
the general contractor and not under any contractual relationship with Taco Time. R.
Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 10
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3.

The neon signs which were purchased by Taco Time and repaired and installed by Sign
Pro were part of the remodel project. R. Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 8; R. Vol. I, p. 10, at 77 7, 8 , 9
and 10; R. Vol. 11, pp. 277 - 78 at 77 7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, p. 292, at 77 7,8,9 and 10

4.

The only causes of action alleged by Taw Time against Leishman Electric in this case are
based in negligence. R. Vol. I, p. 9; R. Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to InterrogatoryNo. 10;
R. Vol. 11, p. 276; R. Vol. 11, p. 291

5.

The damages which Taco Time seeks were, except for a minimal deductible, paid by
Taco Time's fire insurance company. All of the property which was damaged in the fire
was part of the Taw Time restaurant. It included the building, fixtures, contents and
equipment. Taco Time also sought lost profits while the restaurant was closed for repairs.

R. Vol. I, pp. 78 - 79, at f l 1 4 - 18; R. Vol. I, pp. 109- 141 Taco Time sought recovery
of the following items of damages:
Cost of repairs or replacement of the building
Cost of replacement of restaurant equipment
Cost of cleaning contents
Replacement of credit card equipment
Lost business profits
Replace water softener
Replace HVAC unit
Replace business communications equipment
Replacement of floor tile
Inventory/personal property replacement
Furnace replacement
Replace microwave and fieezer
Clean cash registers
These undisputed facts support the trial court's decision to dismiss Taco Time's claims
because they are barred by the economic loss rule.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

If the trial court is reversed and this matter remanded for further proceedings, should
Taco Time be permitted to include a claim for pre-judgment interest in its Amended
Complaint?

2.

If the trial court is reversed and this matter remanded for fiuther proceedings, should the
economic loss doctrine prevent Taco Time's tort recovery for damage to the subject of the
transaction, even if damage to "other property" is identified?
ARGUMENT

A.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARS TACO TIME'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
The United States Supreme Court, exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, and most, if not

every state, in the United States have adopted some form of the economic loss rule either by
judicial decision or by statute. See the cases collected in the appendix to William K. Jones,

Product Deficts Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendency of Corztuact oveu Tout, 44 U. Miami

L. Rev. 73 1, 799 (1990). There are as many versions of the rule as there are jurisdictions which
have applied the rule to a particular set of facts2.

L

For example, Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2005) observed
that because the "economic loss" doctrine permits tort recovery only for personal injury or
damage to "other property," if property is damaged it is necessary to identify the product at issue
which defines "other" property. The subject of "other property" has been approached in a number
of different ways. Much of the law addressing the issue of what constitutes "other property" deals
with whether the other property is a distinct item or merely a component of the overall defective
product. Other courts have focused on whether "goods"
are involved. Yet others have concluded
&at the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery for injury to "other property" if the injury was,
or should have been, reasonably contemplated by the parties to the contract. Some have
concluded that the "product" is-theproduct purchasedby the plaintiff, not the product sold by the
defendant.
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This Court recognized in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircrafr Co., 97
Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1975) that the "economic loss" rule in Idaho has its genesis
in the debate about how far courts were willing to extend tort liability, specifically products
liability, in cases arising out of contractual relationships. In Dean v. Barvett Homes, Inc., 968
A.2d 192, 406 N.J. Super. 453,472 (App.Div. 2009) the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, discussed the interplay between tort law and contract law:
The economic loss rule "defmes the boundary between the overlapping
theories of tort law and contract law by barring the recovery of purely economic
loss in tort, particularly in strict liability and negligence cases." R. Joseph Barton,
Note, Dvowning in a Sea of'contvact: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1789,
1789 (2000). The purpose of the rule is to "strike an equitable balance between
countervailingpublic policies," that exist in tort and contracts law. Geimady A.
Gorel, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for the Intermediate Rule and
Taming the Tovt-eating Monster, 37 Rutgers L. J. 517,524 (2006).
This theoretical basis for the economic loss rule, however, provides little guidance about
how to apply the rule to a particular set of circumstances. In Idaho the economic loss rule is
described as:
Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of
purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent
economic loss to another. Dufin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho
1002,1007,895 P.2d 1195,1200 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Cofin, 113 Idaho 37,
41,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987); Clark v. International Hawester Co., 99 Idaho
326,336,581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978). The rule "applies to negligence cases ifl
general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases." Ramerth v.
Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848,851 (1999) (citations omitted).
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property
which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate
value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps,
Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351, 544 P.2d 306,309 (1975). On the
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other hand, "property damage encompasses damage to property other than that
which is the subject of the transaction." Id.

Blahd v. RichavdB. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300, 108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005)
Distinguishing between the "subject of the transaction" and "other property" is a
perplexing task. The economic loss rule does not seem to be conducive to bright line rules which
makes its application to a particular set of circumstances difficult. That is no less the case here.
Taco Time was in privity of contract with the person or entity Erom whom it purchased the
damaged neon sign and the transformers which did not comply with the National Electrical Code.
Taco Time did not exercise its contractual remedies against the seller for the defects which it
now alleges caused the fire that caused the damages it seeks to recover. Taco Time was in privity
of contract with the general contractor which subcontracted with Leishman Electric for the
electrical work on the remodel project in 199811999. Taco Time did not exercise its contractual
remedies against the general contractor. Taco Tiine was in privity of contract with Sign Pro
which installed the neon signs and connected it to the transformers. Taco Time did exercise its
contractual remedies against Sign Pro and elected to settle for 50% of its loss.
Because of Taco Time's decisions to either not exercise or only partially exercise its
contractual rights against those with which it had privity of contract and, instead, seek recovery
against an entity with which it did not have privity, the trial court was and now this Court is
faced with deciding whether Taco Time should be able to recover the rest of its damages from
Leishman Electric based only on negligence theories. In Texas, this lack of privity would
preclude Taco Time's claims under its interpretation and application of the economic loss rule.

Sterling Chems., Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 259 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2007)
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(Texas courts have applied the economic loss rule to preclude tort claims between parties who
are not in contractual privity)
Citing the "modem trend3" the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Dalcota Gasijkation

Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996), held that the economic loss
rule precluded the owners of an oxygen plant from recovering against the subcontractor who
supplied the pre-engineered metal building that enclosed the oxygen plant4. Similar to this case,
the building did not fail until more than eight years after the subcontractor had finished its work.
That is when a part of the oxygen plant's roof collapsed under the weight of ice and snow,
causing damage to various items within the plant. Although the collapse caused significant
damage to property, it did not cause any personal injuries. The collapse was caused by a faulty
weld which was not, but allegedly should have been, discovered during the construction. The
trial court and the appellate court were faced with trying to determine whether the damage was
only to the product itself [the '"poduct itself' and "the subject of the transaction" are similar, if
not the same concept] or to "other property." Both decided there was no damage to "other
property" and barred recovery based on the economic loss rule:
The trial court recognized that the modem trend in many jurisdictions
holds that tort remedies are unavailable for property damage experienced by the
3

The "modem trend" has been described as the "forseeability test" which involves the
extension of the economic loss doctrine to preclude liability in tort for physical damage to other
nearby property of commercial purchasers who could foresee such risks at the time of purchase.
Dakota GasiJication Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996)
4

It should be noted that although the modern trend is still binding in Eight Circuit federal
litigation, North Dakota has not yet adopted this "modem trend." See Albers v. Deere & Co.,
599 F. Supp. 2d 1142,1147 (D.N.D. 2008)
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owner where the damage was a foreseeable result of a defect at the time the
parties contractually determined their respective exposure to risk, regardless
whether the damage was to the "goods" themselves or to "other property."
Dakota Gasi$catioiz Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996)

.

.

.

it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the natural consequence
of an installed structural component's failure would be daiage only to the
stmctural component itself without any damage to the surrounding property. If
such economic damage is a foreseeable consequence to the parties in a
commercial relationship governed by the UCC, then it is a proper subject for
negotiation and contract law, not for tort remedies. The modem trend's reasoning
is therefore nothing more than a fairly subtle and very logical extension of the
economic loss doctrie discussed in East River and adopted in Coopevative
Power. Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit noted, many cases discussing the "other
property" exception end up holding that the damage was only to the property
itself.
Dakota Gas8cation Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996)
Allowing tort remedies in a case such as this would perversely encourage
contractors to "bargain" for no warranty or insurance protection in exchange for a
reduced purchase price, because they could rely on tort remedies as their
"warranty." Such an outcome is plainly inconsistent with the values of commercial
efficiency and predictability that drive the economic loss doctrine . . ,
Dakota GasiJication Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996)
The facts of this case are not unlike the facts in Dakota Gasification. There the roof
collapsed causing damages to various items in the plant. Here the Ere caused damages to various
items in the Taco Time restaurant. Taco Time has or had contract remedies against those with
which it had contractual relationships. Clearly it could have bargained for warranties and other
contractual protection from those with which it had contractual relationships. Taco Time insured
itself &om the risk of these damages as evidenced by the fact that this is an insurance subrogation
action. R., Vol. I, p. 54, Answer to Interrogatory No. 16 If the "modern trend" were applied to
this case, the "economic loss doctrine" would bar any tort claims for the damages which Taco

-
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Time now seeks to recover from Leishman Electric.

In 1998, the American Law Institute adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, 5 21 which addressed the issue but failed to provide any bright line rule to make
application of the economic loss rule easier. The following comment provides what little
guidance is offered:
Harm to the plaintiff's property other than the defective product itself. A
defective product that causes harm to property other than the defective product
itself is governed by the rules of this Restatement. What constitutes harm to other
property rather than harm to the product itself may be difficult to detennine. A
product that nondangerously fails to function due to a product defect has clearly
caused harm only to itself. A product that fails to function and causes harm to
surrounding property has clearly caused harm to other property. However, when a
component part of a machine or a system destroys the rest of the machine or
system, the characterization process becomes more difficult. When the product or
system is deemed to be an integrated whole, courts treat such damages as harm to
the product itself. When so characterized, the damage is excluded from the
coverage of this Restatement. A contrary holding would require a finding of
property damage in virtually every case in which a product harms itself and would
prevent contractual rules fi-om serving their legitimate function in governing
commercial transactions.
The "integrated whole" referred to in Section 21, Restatement (Third) Torts is also
referred to as an "integrated system analysis." Many courts use this analysis to help determine if
the case involves damage to the product itself (i.e. the subject of the transaction) or damage to
other property. Based on the language in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,301,
108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005) Idaho appears to favor this analysis to help identify whether the
I

damage alleged is to "other property":
The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued the builder and the seller is
immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that determines whether a loss is
property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being sued. The
Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole. Like the leveled lot
and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the transaction in this case is both
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the lot and the house. That being the case, the damages to the Blahds' house are
purely economic' and the Blahds' negligence claims against the Smith Entities and
Jones are barred by the economic loss rule. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court followed this guidance and concluded in this case that: "the various
components of the remodeling, including electrical rewiring

.

. . were of necessity integrated

with the existing building to better facilitate the purpose for which the building was used, a
restaurant." Therefore, the trial court concluded that the subject of the transaction was the
restaurantibuilding and because "Plaintiffs damage claims do not relate to any property 'other
than that which is the subject of the transactio11"' the clai~nsare barred by the economic loss rule.
R. Vol. II,p. 304
Other courts, most notably Wisconsin, have more fully developed the "integrated whole"
analysis which has been identified as the "majority view"':

. . . the homeowners purchased a finished product, their condominium units,
the quality of which fell below expectations. While the Association argues that the
defective windows caused damage to interior and exterior walls and casements,
these are but other component parts in a finished product. Because of the integral
relationship between the windows, the casements and the surrounding walls, the
windows are simply a part of a single system or structure, having no function
apart kom the buildings for which they were manufactured.
Bay Breeze Condo. Ass'n v. Norco Windows, 2002 WI App 205,651 N.W.2d 738 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002)
Regardless whether property is other property in a literal sense, it may be
"other property" in a legal sense for purposes of the economic loss doctrine. See

5

Dean v, Barvett Homes, inc., 406 N.J. Super. 453,470, 968 A.2d 192 (App.Div. 2009)
concluded that in the case of construction defects, the integrated system analysis is the majority
view:
- "We conclude that the sounder view is expressed by us most recently in Marrone and the
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the critical issue. Here, plaintiffs purchased a house,
not exterior siding, and the exterior siding was an integrated component of the finished product
of that house.
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Grams v. Milk Prods., inc., 2005 WI 112, PP27, 3 1,283 Wis. 2d 51 1, 699
N.W.2d 167. At least two tests are used to determine whether damaged property is
"other property" in a legal sense: the "integrated system" test and the
"disappointed expectations" test. Id., PP27-28,3 1. We discuss both below and
then, in subsequent subsections, apply them.
Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Znc., 2006 WI App 246,297 Wis. 2d 724,
726 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
What is immediately apparent from reading the Foremost Farms case is that in many
situations the "integrated system" test and the "disappointed expectations" test can be difficult
and complicated to apply. Thus, not even this approach results in an easy fix to the complicated
analysis necessary to determine if the economic loss rule applies. However, the "integrated
system" test which looks to see whether the allegedly defective product is a component in a
larger system, appears to answer the questions presented by this case. The electrical subcontract
work of Leishman Electric which involved re-wiring the electrical system in the Taco Time
building so that it could function as a restaurant, including running power to components like the
transformers for the neon signs, was completely integrated into a larger system, that being the
remodeled restaurant building. Under these circumstances the restaurantibuilding was an
integrated system. The electrical wiring had no function apart ij-om the restaurant where it was
installed. According to the Foremost Farms decision, "If damaged property is not "other
property" under the "integrated system" test, the economic loss doctrine applies and tort claims
are barred. The "other property" inquiry ends."
So it is in this case. The Memorandum Decision denying Taco Time's Motion for
Reconsideration and granting summary judgment to Leishman Electric stated:
It is the restaurantibuilding, not the services provided via remodeling, that was the
subject of the transaction; and it was the building, its contents, and the profits
derived from the building's use that were damaged by the fire. Plaintiffs damage

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 15

claims do not relate to any property "other that which is the subject of the
transaction."

R. Vol. 11, p. 304
The trial courf was correct in dismissing Taco Tirne's claims because they are barred by
the economic loss rule.

B.

A CALAMITOUS EVENT IS NOT A RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN IDAHO AND IS NOT A GOOD TEST FOR
DETERMINING WHEN THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES
Taco Time contends that the economic loss rule does not apply "where an accident,

casualty event, disaster, or other calanitous event" occurs. Appellant's Opening BrieE; p. 2 1
This argument is raised for the first time on appeal and should not be considered. Rainerth v.

Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848 (Idaho 1999) (exceptions to the econoinic loss rule
which were not asserted nor decided by the district court will not be considered for the first time
on appeal) R. Vol. 11, pp. 285-287
In the event this Court does consider the application of this exception, Taco Tinle's
argument should be rejected for several reasons. The United States Supreme Court rejected this
exception as a basis for determining whether the economic loss rule applies in E. River S.S.Coup.

v. Trnnsamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858,870,90 L.Ed. 2d 865, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (US. 1986):

. . . Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in
which the product is injured. We realize that the damage may be qualitative,
occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be
calamitous. Compare Movrow v. New Moon Homes, Irzc., 548 P. 2d 279 (Alaska
1976), with Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P. 2d 248,251 (Alaska 1977). But either
way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss
is purely economic. Even when the hann to the product itself occurs through an
abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value,
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of
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its bargain -- traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth,
Contracts 3 12.8, pp. 839-840 (1982)
The "destructive or calamitous exception" appears to be a minority view. See discussion

-

in E. Rivei,S.S. Covp. v. TransarnevicaDelaval, 476 U.S. 858, at 869 870 (US. 1986)
Kentucky rehsed to adopt this exception as a valid method for determining when to apply the
economic loss rule:

.

.

.

we hold that the destructive or calainitous exception to the E.conomic
Loss Rule does not apply in Kentucky. As the Supreme Court of the United States
noted in East River S.S. Corp. and as the Graves Circuit Court noted herein, there
is no logical reason to determine the amount of damages available based on
whether a product failed by small increments or suddenly. The end result is the
same, the product failed.

Indus. Risk Insurers v. Giddings &Lewis, Inc., 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. July 2,
2009)
One of the decisions relied upon by Taco Time to support its argument that the
"destructive or calamitous" exception is good policy has been rejected by a later decision.

Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236,243 (6th Cir. Mich. 1994) (Our decision today
explicitly rejects the approach taken by the district court in Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor &

Schwartz, 802 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Mich. 1992), affd on other grounds, 15 F.3d 558 (6th Cir.
1994)) The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also strongly suggested that the distinction
between "disaster and mere commercial disappointment" is not the "bright line rule" which Taco
Time suggests it is. Detroit Edison Co. v. NRBCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236,242 (6th Cir. Mich. 1994):
We recognize that the extent of the damage--both to property and persons-suggests a hazardous product and, therefore, implicates concerns addressed by
tort law. [citations omitted] However, the approach adopted by Neibarger focuses
our inquiry not so much on the magnitude or extent of the damage as on the
parties involved and the nature of the product's use.

-
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Other courts have predicted that if the issue were presented to the Idaho Supreme Court,
it would not adopt the "destructive or calamitous" exception to the economic loss rule:

.

.

. the United States Supreme Court has rejected an attempt to distinguish

cases based on the manner in which the product is damaged. E. River S.S. COT?.v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,872, 106 S. Ct. 2295,90 L. Ed. 2d 865
(1986). Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt,
accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value and lost
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its
bargain -- traditionally the core concern of contract law. Id. at 870. A federal court
in Idaho also has predicted that Idaho courts would refuse to recognize a "sudden
and calamitous event" exception to the economic loss rule. See Memorandum
And Order filed March 3, 1999 in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfegev Corp., D.
Idaho No. 97-0490-E-BLW, at 8, attached to Reply In Support Of Cessna Aircraft
Company 's Motion For Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs Spirit Air, Inc.
And Mountain Bird, Inc. (Doc. # 602) filed October 15,2008. This Court likewise
predicts that the Idaho Supreme Court would decline to create an accident
exception to the ecoiiomic loss rule.

In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (D. Kan.2008)
Judge Winmill's decision in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., D. Idaho No. 970490-E-BLW is appended to this Brief. Concluding that the "sudden and calamitous event"
exception is the minority rule, Judge Winmill predicted that the Idaho Supreme Court would
refuse to adopt it.
It is unclear @omAppellant's Opening Brief whether Taco Time believes the Idaho
appellate courts have already adopted the "destructive or calamitous exception" or whether Taco
Time is advocating its adoption. To date, the Idaho Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized
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the "destructive or calamitous exception." Idaho currently recognizes two (or three) exceptions6
to the economic loss rule:
The general rule in Idaho is that there is no recovery for pure economic
loss in a negligence action, as there is no "duty" to prevent economic loss to
another. Duf$n v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895
P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). The two exceptions to this general rule are where a
special relationship exists and the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a
different allocation of risk.

Nelson v. Anderson Lumbev Co., 140 Idaho 702,710,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004)
Although the "special relationship" exception has been applied to the facts of one case,
the "unique circumstances" exception has never been applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in any
of the cases presented to it.. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,299, 108 P.3d 996
(Idaho 2005) Taco Time does

argue that this case presents a situation where the "unique

circumstances" exception should apply, but Taco Time does argue that the "special relationship"
exception applies. That argument will be addressed later in this Brief.
Although fairly siinple to explain, the economic loss rule is difficult to apply. A fact
which Judge Moss candidly admitted when he stated "I've struggled with this, gentlemen, for at
least five or six years on this miserable rule and when I think I've got it figured out there's a new
wrinkle in it and I'm not sure it's as easy as you're presenting." Tr., p. 20, LL 17 - 21 Another
exception will only make the economic loss rule more unclear and difficult to apply. Idaho

'Judge Winmill inJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfeger COT., D. Idaho No. 97-0490-EBLW stated that Idaho recognizes three exceptions. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Nelson v.
Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,710,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) states that Idaho
recognizes two exceptions while in Graefe v. Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349,350,972 P.2d 317 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1999) it identified three exceptions.
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should not adopt the "destructive or calamitous exception" which several courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have found to be illogical. The ''desbxctive or calamitous
exception" does not further the policies behind the "economic loss" rule and will not make the
rule easier to understand or easier to apply.
C.

IN THIS CASE THERE IS NO PROPERTY OTHER THAN THAT WHICH IS
THE SUBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION SO THE 'PARASITIC EXCEPTION'
DOES NOT APPLY TO SAVE TACO TIME'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
Taco Time faults the trial court for not giving it the benefit of the "parasitic exception" to

the economic loss rule. This Taco Time claims "evidences its [the trial court's] lack of
understanding of the scope or proper applications ofthe economic loss rule." Appellant's
Opening Brief, p. 28 The trial court understood that its task was to identify the "subject of the
transaction" so that it could determine if there was any "other property" to which Taco Time's
economic loss could be parasitic. It is not surprising that the trial court found the "instaIlation of
the signs" was integrated into the building because, from the beginning, Taco Time claimed that
the neon signs were purchased by it aid repaired and installed by Sign Pro as part of the remodel
project. R. Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 8; R. Vol. I, p. 10, at

-

7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, pp. 277 78 at fl

7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, p. 292, at 77 7,8,9 and 10 Those admissions support the trial COW'S
conclusion that it was the remodeled restauranthuilding which was the subject of the transaction,
not the neon sign and transformer installation contract as argued by Taco Time. To save its
negligence claims against Leishman Electric the economic losses must be parasitic to "other
damage" and not to the subject of the transaction. DuBn v. Idaho C ~ o Improvement
p
Ass'n, 126
Idaho 1002, 1007,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995) ("property loss" encompasses "damage to
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property other than that which is the subject of the transaction.")
The use of the phrase "economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or
property" began in Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462,469,583 P.2d 997 (Idaho 1978)
(cases where the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses without alleging any
attending personal injury or property damage must be distinguished from cases involving the
recovery of economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or property).

Dufjn v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,1007,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho
1995) more fully developed the phrase " parasitic to an injury to person or property." The Idaho
Supreme Court explained:
Following Just's, this Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the
recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions. See, e.g., Tusch
Enters. v. CofJin, 113 Idaho 37,41,740 P.2d 1022,1026 (1987) (defending the
rule that "purely economic losses are not recoverable in negligence"). Based solely
on the application of this general rule, the district court's analysis regarding the
recovery of economic loss in tort would be correct; ordinarily a party would owe
no duty to exercise due care to prevent the type of loss suffered by the Duffins.
However, there are exceptions to the general rule of non-recovery.
First, economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to
person or property. E.g., Just's at 468,583 P.2d at 1003. We have defined
"economic loss" as including "costs of repair and replacement of defective
property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975)
(citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds. Conversely, "property loss"
encompasses "damage to property other than that which is the subject of the
transaction." Id. See also Tusch Enterprises v. Cofjn, 113 Idaho 37,41,740 P.2d
1022, 1026 (1987); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d
1349, 1350 (1985); ClarkInternational Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,332,581
P.2d 784,790 (1978). Since the losses claimed here are purely economic, this
exception is inapplicable.
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See also Graefe v. Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349,350,972 P.2d 317 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999)
(Although the general rule is that such losses are not recoverable, the Dufin Court went on to
state that in certain instances, a party can recover for purely economic loss in tort when: (1) it is
parasitic to an injury to person or property; (2) the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a
different allocation of the risk; or (3) where a "special relationship" exists between the parties)
Taco Time appears to recognize that, in cases of property damage, before the economic
loss is considered "parasitic to an injury to property)))the damage must be to "other property"
ineaning property other than that which is subject to the transaction. This is clearly the rule in
Idaho. In Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 301, 108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005) the
Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it "is the subject of the transaction that determines whether
a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being sued." The trial
court in this case held that the subject of the transaction was the extensive remodel project in
199811999 which made the entire restaurant and building an integrated whole for purposes of
applying the econoinic loss rule. R., Vol. II,p. 304
The Idaho Supreme Court has decided cases which are conceptually similar to this case
and those decisions help determine the subject of the transaction for purposes of applying the
economic loss rule in this case. In Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848 (Idaho
1999) Ramerth attempted to avoid the application of the economic loss rule by arguing that it
was Hart's service which was the subject of the transaction and not the engine or the airplane that
was serviced. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that it was the airplane,
not the mechanical services, which was the subject of the transaction. Similarly, in Dufin v.
Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d 1195 (1995) the Idaho Supreme Court
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held that it was the seed, not the inspection, which was the subject of the transaction. In Tusch

Enterprises v. Co@n, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987) the Idaho Supreme Court held that it
was the duplex itself, not the construction, which was the subject of the transaction.
Following the reasoning of those cases, the trial court was correct in concluding that the
subject of the transaction in this case was the remodeling of the restauranthuilding, not the neon
sign and transformer installation contract. The decision in C & S Hamilton Hay, LLC v. CNN

Am. LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 13151, 10-11 (D. Idaho Feb. 21,2008) does not dictate a
different result. Judge Lodge distinguished the decision in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,197,
983 P.2d 848 (Idaho 1999):

. . . The factual circumstances in Ramerth presented a different issue to
decide than the one faced by the Court in this case. The court in Ramevth was
required to determine whether or not there was a difference between service
performed on the engine and the engine itself that would create a distinction as to
what constituted the "subject of the transaction." In this case no service has been
performed and therefore the Court is not asked to make such a distinction. A
relationship between sewice and the physical item receiving the service would
support the "integrated whole" idea from Blahd However, in tlus case the Court
fails to see how an itemlservice relationship relates to two separate physical items
and the Court is not convinced that Ramevth warrants a finding that the
implements in this case constitute the "subject of the transaction." Therefore a
finding that the impiements constitute "economic loss" wouid be improper.
(Emphasis supplied)
C & S Hamilton Hay, LLCv. CNHAm. LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13151, 10-11 (D. Idaho
Feb. 21,2008)
That distinction described by Judge Lodge makes the C&S Hamilton Hay decision
inapplicable to the facts of this case. Leishman Electric supplied material and services to
perform the electrical subcontract on the Taco Time restaurant in 199811999,just like the
mechanic did when he performed his overhaul and service of the airplane engine in Rumerth. It
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is the electrical services which Taco Time claims caused the fire in this case, just as it was the
claim of Ramerth that Hart's mechanic services caused the damage to the engine and airframe of
the airplane when Hart left out the four spacers in the course of the overhaul. Judge Lodge was
correct when he observed that if there was a "relationship between service and the physical item
receiving the service" it would support the "integrated whole" idea from Blahd. There are no
"peripherals" in this case because, like the trial court concluded, the business was an integrated
whole and all of the damage was to the "subject of the transaction" and is considered economic
loss. "Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air. Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544
P.2d 306,309 (1975)
There must be damage to other property, i.e. property which was

the "subject of the

transaction" to establish "property damage" which can eliminate the application of the econoinic
loss ntle based on the theory of "parasitic loss." There is no "other property damage" in this case
and therefore the theory of (or exception for) "parasitic loss" is not applicable.
D.

THE BUILDING REMODEL WAS THE TRANSACTION AND THE SUBJECT
OF THE TRANSACTION WAS THE RESTAURANTBUILDING
Taco Time urges this Court to separate the remodeling transaction from the transaction

for the installation of the transformers and neon sign. It is undisputed that there was no
contractual relationship between Taco Time and Leishman Electric. Leishrnan Electric
performed all of its work as part of its subcontract with the general contractor who had the
contract for the remodel of the restaurantbuilding. R. Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory
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No. 10 Taco Time's argument that the subject of the transaction for determining the liability of
Leishman Electric is a transaction with which Leishman E!ectric admittedly had no involvement
makes no sense. It makes even less sense when judged against Taco Time's repeated admissions
that the purchase and installation of the neon signs were part of the remodel project.

In the original decision granting Leishman Electric's economic loss motion for summary
judgment in part and denying it in part, the trial court concluded "the subject of the transaction
with which Leishman Electric was involved was the remodel project" and decided "that the
economic loss rule bars any negligence claims asserted against Leishman Electric, except for
property damage not involved with the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 The trial court did not
identify what it thought was damage to "other property" except to note in a footnote that "some
of the damage claims appear to be separate from the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 at fn 6

In Taco Time's Motion for Reconsideration, it did not identify the "other property." The
Motion for Reconsideration claimed:
The fire damage to the building and equipment clearly establishes "other property
damage." The Court's prior Memorandum Decision acknowledges "other
property damage." By definition, where there is "other property damage," the
"economic loss rule does not apply under the governing Idaho case law."

R. Vol. 11, p. 286

In further support of its argument that there was "other property damage" Taco Time
submitted the Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen which laboriously attempted to separate
"economic losses" from "non-economic losses." R. Vol. I, pp. 109 - 141 Although the
restaurant was expanded during the 199811999 remodel, "95% of all electrical wiring was new
in the remodel." R. Vol. I, p. 111 at 7 6 The electrical wiring, of course, was part of Leishman
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Electric's subcontract. The trial court concluded as folIows afier considering the submission by
Taco Time:
Brian Larsen's second affidavit of April, 2008, illustrates the difficulty of
attempting to parse the buildingtrestaurant into portions that were actually being
remodeled and portions that were not. This affidavit reveals that the building and
remodeling are an "integrated whole", and that it was the buildinglrestaurant as an
integrated whole that was the "subject of the transaction."
R. Vol. 11, p. 302 at fn 1
On appeal Taco Time relies on the same affidavit the trial court considered. Appellant's
Opening Brief, pp. 11 - 13 However, having failed to convince the trial court that it could
identify the damage claims which were "separate from the remodel project" Taco Time has
changed tactics on appeal. Taco Time now argues that the "only defective property involved in
this case is the neon sign and transformers." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34 Taco Time further
argues that the "transaction" was the "agreement between Taco Time and Sign Pro to install the
neon sign and transformer." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34 Its theory to avoid application of
the economic loss rule is illustrated by this statement:
Rather, the correct economic loss analysis identifies the only neon sign and
transformer as the defective property. Such property was the "subject o P the
"transaction" between Sign Pro and Taco Time. Such property was not the
"subject of' any "transaction between Taco Time and the general contractor."
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 37
Based on this analysis, Taco Time argues on appeal that the fire resulted in damage to the
"defective neon sign and transformer" and everything else was "other property" including "the
building, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, other personal property and contents located
therein." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 28
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This analysis ignores that the basis for Taco Time's claim against Leishman Electric is
that Leishman Electric allegedly breached its duty as the electrical contractor by connecting "the
primary building power supply to the defective neon sign and obsolete transformer without
bothering to inspect or determine whether it was safe to do so." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 19
There must be a nexus between the "transaction" and the "reach of duty." In every Idaho case
involving the economic loss rule there was a nexus between the transaction and the breach of
duty. Blahdv. RichavdB. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300, 108 P.3d 996(Idaho 2005) reviewed
the prior "econoinic loss" decisions and clarified what "transaction" meant: "These cases indicate
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a business deal--it
means the subject of the lawsuit." It would not he the "subject of the lawsuit" without a nexus.
The "transaction" for purposes of this case is not a business deal between Taco Time and
Sign Pro to install transformers and a neon sign. The trial court correctly concluded that "the
damage claims arise from restaurant property damaged by the fire." R. Vol. II, p. 304 Leishman
Electric's only nexus was as a subcontractor to the general contractor who was hired to remodel
the Taco Time building to make it a better restaurant, not to make a building which was later
converted into a restaurant. Leishman Electric did not just wire the transformer to which Sign
Pro connected the neon signs. Leishman Electric rewired 95% of the entire restaurant building.
In Blahd the homeowner ''purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole." Here Taco Time
purchased a remodeled restaurant and the "various components of the remodeling, including
electrical rewiring, installation of the signs, and other huilding improvements were wholly
integrated into the building, not separate and apart from it." R. Vol. II, p. 304 It was the building
and the restaurant which were the subject of the transaction.
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The trial court's conclusion that the subject of the transaction was the restauranthuilding
is supported by the numerous cases involving defective component parts. A good example is Pro
Con, Inc. v. J&B Drywall, Inc., 20 Mass. L. Rep. 466 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006)

In claims involving defective component parts, most courts have held that
the relevant "product" is the finished product into which the component is
integrated. See, e.g., East River, 476 U.S. at 867-68 (stating in admiralty law that
"since all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a contrary]
holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in vitally every case where a
product damages itself. . . and would eliminate the distinction between warranty
and strict products liability.")
This is entirely consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's use of the "integrated whole"
concept in Blahd where it held that the house and lot must be considered an integrated whole and
any damage to the house or the lot is considered purely economic loss. Some courts have
described the task of determining the subject of the transaction as one of looking for the identity
of the product purchased by the plaintiff, as opposed to the product sold by the defendant. It
would make no sense for the court to look for a transaction which even Taco Time admits did not
involve Leishnan Electric to find the subject of the transaction. The only "product" which Taco
Time purchased and which involved Leishman Electric was a remodeled restaurant. Because the
finished product was the result of work by many contractors, it is completely logical to consider
the remodeled restauranthuilding an "integrated whole." It integrated all the work performed
by the various contractors who completed the project. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Shipco 2295, Inc. v, Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925,927 (5th Cir. La. 1987)
involved a lawsuit by a ship owner alleging tort theories against the vessel builderlseller and the
designer of a component part of the vessels for damage to the vessels themselves. Relying
heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in East River Steamship Corp. v.
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Transamevica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,90 L. Ed. 2d 865, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986), the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that:
Permitting a buyer to assert a tort claim against a subcontractor or
component supplier may also implicate the seller; the supplier or subcontractor
who is sued in tort can be expected to assert indemnity or contribution claims
against the seller which assembled the product and incorporated the supplier's
coinponent or work in the finished product. The effect of such a claim, if
successful, would visit ultimate tort liability for defects in the vessel on the
manufacturer and seller and would nullify the objective of East Rivev to limit the
seller's liability in this type case to that assumed by contract.
Several cases decided by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits under Minnesota
and California law support the view that the product in this context means the
finished product bargained for by the buyer rather than components furnished by a
supplier. [citations omitted]
Shipco, 825 F.2d 925,930
The same result should apply in this case. For purposes of determining whether the
economic loss rule applies to bar Taco Time's claims against Leishrnan Electric, the finished
product bargained for by Taco Time was the remodeled restauranthuilding, not the installed
neon sign and transformer. Taco Time has not identified any property which was not part of the
"building, its contents, and the profits derived from the building's use that were damaged by the
fire." R. Vol. 11, p. 304 All of the damages claimed by Taco Time are economic loss resulting
6-om the subject of the transaction and are barred by the economic loss rule.
E.

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY
Taco Time contends that because Leishman Electric was a licensed electrical contractor,

the "special relationship" exception should apply to take this case out of the operation of the
economic loss rule. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 30 This argument is raised for the first time
on appeal and should not be considered. Rarnevth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848
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(Idaho 1999) (exceptions to the economic loss rule which were not asserted nor decided by the
district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal) R. Vol. 11, pp. 285 - 287

In the event this Court does consider the application of this exception, Taco Time's
argument should he rejected because there was no "special relationship" between Taco Time and
Leishman Electric. Taco Time had no direct contract with Leishman Electric. Leishman Electric
was a subcontractor to the general contractor with which Taco Time contracted. Taco Time did
not purchase the neon signs and transformers &om Leishman Electric. Taco Time did not
contract with Leishman Electric to repair or install the neon signs and transformers. The
evidence that Taco Time had a special relationship with Leishman Electric or relied on Leishman
Electric for any critical work or inspections related to the neon signs is not present in this case.

In fact, Brian Larsen, one of the owners of Taco Time testified as follows in his deposition:
22
23
24
25

26
Q. I just want to make sure that this is in the
record. You know for a fact that Leishman Electric had
nothing to do with repairing the neon signs; correct?
A. Correct.

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

27
Q. You never talked to Leishman Electric about
installing the neon signs?
A. Specifically installing the neon signs?
Q. Yes.
A. I did not have that conversation.
Q. Did you ever talk to anybody at Leishman
Electric and request that they inspect or evaluate the
neon signs or the work of Sign Pro?
A. I did not ask them to inspect the work of Sign
Pro.
Q. Did you ever ask Leishman Electric to inspect
the transformers that were in those boxes?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever ask Leishman Electric whether
Sign Pro was qualified to do the work that you had hired
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16 them to do?
17
A. No.
Brian Larsen deposition, pp. 26, L 22 - 27 L 17 (attached to Leishrnan Electric's Motion to
Augment)
Because there was no personal relationship between Taco Time and Leishman Electric
the "special relationship" described in McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 97 Idaho 777,
554 P.2d 955 (1976) is not applicable to the facts of this case. The "special relationship"
described in Dufin v. Idaho Crop ImprovementAssfn, 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195
(Idaho 1995) is also inapplicable. Duffin found a "special relationship" with the Idaho Crop
Improvement Association (ICIA) but not with the Federal-State Inspection Service (FSIS). The
"special relationship" with ICIA was based on the fact that it had engaged in a marketing
campaign, for the benefit of its members, the very purpose of which was to induce reliance by
purchasers on the fact that potato seed had been certified. In contrast, no "special relationship"
was found to exist with the FSIS because there was no theory from which it could be concluded
that FSIS had actively sought to induce reliance on the part of purchasers of certified seed. The
seed was inspected by the FSIS and found to be within tolerances for the absence of disease and
FSIS inspectors placed tags on the trucks delivering the seed which designated that seed as
"certified." However, that was not enough to create a "special relationship" with the FSIS.
Applied to the facts of this case, Leishman Electric did not actively seek to induce
reliance on the part of Taco Time. The fact the Leishman Electric was a licensed electrical
contractor and performed electrical work as part of its subcontract is not sufficient to create a
"special relationship" in this case.
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,711,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App.
2004), where there was no direct relationship between the licensed engineer and the homeowner,
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is also instructive:
With respect to Wicher, at no time did the Nelsons or Steinbruegge have
any contact with Wicher. Wicher, a licensed engineer, was hired by IBP to review
the Nelson's cabin plans. There was no relationship at all between Wicher and the
Nelsons. Thus, there is no special relationship between Wicher and the Nelsons
similar to that found in DufJin. With consideration of the Idaho Supreme Court's
holding in Dufin that a special relationship only applies to an extremely limited
group of cases, we decline the invitation to expand that principle to the facts of
this case.

In the words of the Idaho Supreme Court there are an "extremely limited group of cases"
where the "special relationship" exception will apply. Dufin, 126 Idaho 1002 at 1008 There are
no facts in this case which would establish a "special relationship" between Taco Time and
Leishman Electric.

F.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FIRST DECISION IN WHICH IT "PARSED"
DAMAGES BETWEEN WHAT WAS DIRECTLY SUBJECT TO THE
REMODELING AND THE PARTS THAT WERE NOT IS SUPPORTED BY
CASES R O M OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Taco Time severely criticizes the trial court's original decision which found that the

economic loss rule precluded Taco Time's negligence claims against Leishman Electric for
damage to property which was the subject of the transaction. However, in a footnote the trial
court salvaged a portion of the claim by stating: "This ruling does not dismiss all property
damage claims asserted by Taco Time because some of the damage claims appear to be separate
from the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 Taco Time claims this holding "evidences a lack of
understanding of the rule's proper application." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 28
Actually many courts, using the economic loss analysis, have denied recovery for
I

damages to the subject of the transaction and allowed recovery of damages to "other property."
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This is well-summarized in Albers v. Deere & Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1164 (D.N.D. 2008)
If the court is wrong about the header and the gasoline not being "other
property" and tort recovery is permitted, Albers argues he is entitled to recover a11
of his losses, including the loss of the combine. Essentially, his arpnent is that
the economic loss doctrine does not apply whatsoever once there is injury to
persons or "other property." While there is some support for this argument, C & S
Hamilton Hay, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13151,2008 WL 504031 at *4 (applying
Idaho law); Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 1992 OK 155,845 P.2d 187,189,193
(Okla. 1992), it appears most courts would apply the economic loss doctrine to
limit tort recovery for damage to the product, even when there is personal injury
or damage to "other property." E.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v.
American Eirrocopter, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3401 1,2005 WL 1610653,
"16 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (applying North Carolina law); Corsica Cooperative
Association, 967 F. Supp. at 387 (applying South Dakota law); Fleetwood
Enterprises, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. 2001).
Because there is no Idaho decision which precisely addresses this issue, it is not clear that
Judge Lodge's decision in C & S Hamilton Hay accurately applied Idaho law and it is certainly
not binding precedent on this Court. However, it is presumptuous for Taco Time to suggest that
the trial court lacked "understanding of the rule's proper application" where other courts have
done exactly the same thing as the trial court did when applying the economic loss rule.
It should be noted, however, that "incidental" property damage is not sufficient to avoid
the bar of the economic loss rule. Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573,576 (7th
Cir. Wis. 1990) explained:
Incidental property damage, however, will not take a commercial dispute
outside the economic loss doctrine, Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of
America, Inc., 782 F.2d 723,726-29 (7th Cir. 1986); the tail will not be allowed to
wag the dog.
While Leishman Electric fully supports the trial court's decision completely dismissing
Taco Time's negligence claims by reason of the application of the economic loss rule, the
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original order was not clearly erroneous in view of the above referenced authorities. If the order
dismissing Leishnan Electric is reversed, this Court should not permit Taco Time to recover all
of its damages. Those damages to property which was the subject of the transaction should still
be barred.
G.

IF THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING TACO TIME'S COMPLAINT IS REVERSED
AND TACO TIME IS ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAmT IT SHOULD
NOT INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
This issue need not be addressed unless the judgment dismissing Taco Time's claims

against Leishman Electric is reversed. Leishman Electric agrees that "joint and several liability"
with Sign Pro is not appropriate. However, that does not end the inquiry because two additional
issues are implicated: (1) the proposed amended complaints seek recovery of 100% of Taco
Time's damages which necessarily includes damages to the subject of the transaction and (2) the
proposed amended complaints seek a recovery for pre-judgment interest.
Leishman Electric submits that if the judgment is reversed, Taco Time should not be
allowed to recover damage to the subject of the transaction. Because this issue is briefed and
argued above, the authorities and arguments in support of this position are not restated here. For
the reasons stated above, the damages sought in any amended complaint should not include
damages to the subject of the transaction.
The issue of pre-judgment interest was raised by Leishman Electric in opposition to Taco
Time's Motion to Amend, hut the trial court did not reach the issue because it granted Leishman
Electric's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although amendments are to be liberally granted,
there is also a long-standing rule in Idaho that when considering whether to grant a motion for
leave to amend, a trial court may consider whether the amended pleading sets out a valid claim.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 34

Spuv Prods. Covp. 11. StoelRives LLP,142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 300 (Idaho 2005); See also
Duffin v. Idaho Crop ImprovementAssfn, 126 Idaho 1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995)
(although leave to amend is to be freely given the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court); Black Canyon Racquetball Club v. Idaho First
Nut? Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900 (Idaho 1991) (when determining whether an
amended complaint should be allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed
to be inserted into the action by the amended conlplaint state a valid claim)
The proposed amended complaints which have been filed with the trial court seek prejudgment interest. R. Vol. 11, p. 279 at 7 24 and p. 296 at 'l/ 29 This is not an appropriate case
for pre-judgment interest. Farm Dev. Covp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918,920,478 P.2d 298
(Idaho 1970) (the amount upon which the interest is to be based must have been mathematically
and definitely ascertainable to support a claim for pre-judgment interest); Bott v. Idaho State
Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,591,917 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1996) (the district court erred in awarding
prejudgment interest since the damages were not finally ascertainable until the district court ruled
on the ISBA'S motion for judgment n.0.v.); Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 17,43
P.3d 768 (Idaho 2002) (even where Plaintiff clearly suffered some amount of damages prior lo
the time they brought suit; the actual amount of damage was not ascertainable until the jury
returned its verdict and Plaintiff was not entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest)
Taco Time argued at one point in the proceedings that it was entitled to "pre-judgment
interest" by reason of the decision in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho
28,33, 72 P.3d 868 (Idaho 2003) which relied on Yoz~ngv.Extension Ditch Co., 13 Idaho 174,
182, 89 P. 296,298 (1 907). Mussell involved damages to a ditch while Young involved damage
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to farm ground caused by the operators of a ditch. Both cases state that for damages to land the
measure of damages is the actual cash value of the land or the cost of repair "with legal interest
thereon." Mussell, 139 Idaho 28,33; Young, 13 Idaho 174, 182 A close reading of both
decisions reveals that whether or not "pre-judgment interest" could be recovered in such cases
was not the issue and it does not even appear that pre-judgment interest was calculated or
awarded in either case.
The present case does not involve damage to land and the decisions in Mussell and Young
offer no rationale or logic why pre-judgment interest should be awarded in a case such as the one
presented here. In McGuire v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg. Co., 23 Idaho 608,614, 131 P. 654
(Idaho 1913), the Idaho Supreme Court established the measure of damages for property and
fixtures nearly 100 years ago:
Where the property is totally destroyed or so badly injured and impaired as
to render it valueless for the use to which it was origindly designed and
appropriated, the measure of damages should be the value of the property at the
time of its destruction. Where, however, the property is merely damaged and is
capable of being repaired, the measure of damage should be the cost of repair
together with the value of the use of the property during the time that it would
take to repair it.
Cf. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City ofIdaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 10,407 P.2d 695,699
(1965) (in civil action, the measure of damages for property or merchandise which is totally
destroyed is the value of the property at the time and place of its destruction); Latham Motors,

Inc., v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 689,696,851 P.2d 985,992 (Ct. App. 1992) (in civil action, measure
of damages for the total loss of a car is the fair market value of the car at the time of its loss); also
see IDJI 9.07:

If the jury decides that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
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om the defendant, the

jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage to plaintiffs property are:
[eithed

1. The reasonable cost of necessaty repairs to the damaged
property, plus the difference between its fair market value before it was
damaged and its fair market value after repairs.
[or1
1. The difference between the fair market value of the property
immediatelybefore the occurrence, and its [salvage value] [fair market
value without repairs] after the occurrence.
The Idaho Jury Instructions define "fair market value" for property as follows in WJI 9.12:
When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or
"actual cash value" in these instructions as to any item of property, I
mean the amount of money that a willing buyer would pay and a
willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open
marketplace, in the item's condition as it existed immediately prior
to the occurrence in question.
Nowhere in the history of Idaho jurisprudence is it suggested that in a case like this involving
fire damage to a building and its contents is a plaintiff entitled to pre-judgment interest. More
importantly, there is no suggestion in the cases involving damage to buildings and its contents, that
such awards are exempt from the well-established rule that a grant of pre-judgment interest requires
a showing that the damages were liquidated, even in cases where pre-judgment interest is allowed
by an agreement in a contract or by statute. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho
756,762,992 P.2d 75 1 (Idaho 1999) The Idaho Supreme Court held in Boel v. Stewart Title Guar.
Co., 137 Idaho 9, 17, 43 P.3d 768 (Idaho 2002):
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The title insurancepolicy did not specify a liquidated amount or amechanism
for mathematically determiningthe amount of damages the Boels would suffer as the
result of any particular title defect. Contrary to Stewart Title's argument, the Boels
clearly suffered some amount of damages prior to the time they brought suit;
however, the actual amount of damage was not ascertainable until the jury returned
its verdict. Consequently, the district court's decision to deny the Boels' claim for prejudgment interest is affirmed.

In this case the amount of the damages is disputed and the share attributable to Leishman
Electric, if any, is disputed. The actual amount of damage is not ascertainable until a verdict is
returned in this case. Therefore, pre-judgment interest is not appropriate and if Taco Time is
permitted to file an amended complaint, it should not be permitted to include a claim seeking prejudgment interest because such a claim does not state a valid claim for relief under the circumstances
of this case.

H.

TACO TIME IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Leishman Electric did not seek attorney fees below and does not seek attorney fees on appeal.

Application of the "economic loss" rule is difficult and it is no surprise that the parties to this appeal
see the issues differently. ''When there are fairly debatablequestions, attorneyfees arenot awardable
pursuant to LC. $ 12-121." Sunnyside Indus. & Proj'l Park, LLC v. Eastern Idaho Pub. Health

Dist., 2009 Ida. App. LEXS 33 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 28,2009) Regardless of the outcome of this
appeal, Leishman Electric does not believe that it has defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation. The trial court twice ruled in favor of Leishman Electric's arguments on the
"economic loss" rule and Leishman Electric has submitted substantial authorities and facts which
support the trial court's decisions. Leishman Electric requests that Taco Time's request for attorney
fees on appeal be denied.
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CONCLUSION
Leishman Electric subcontracted to rewire the Taco Time restaurant as a part of remodeling
project in 1998 and 1999. The transaction was the remodeling project and the subject of the
transaction was the remodeled restaurant and building. That is what Taco Time purchased. It was
an integrated whole and all of the damages which Taco Time sought to recover against Leishman
Electric as a result of the 2004 fire were damages to the subject of the transaction. The court below
was correct when it dismissed Taco Time's claims against Leishman Electric because the damage
claims are barred by the economic loss rule. Leishman Electric requests this Court to affirm the

wurt below.
If the judgment dismissingLeishman Electric is reversed and this matter remanded for further
proceedings, Leishman Electric requests this Court to hold that if damages to "other property" are
found all damages to the subject of the transaction are barred by the economic loss rule. Leishman
Electric further requests this Court to hold that Taco Time is not entitled to recover pre-judgment
interest in this case.
DATED this

q?

day of August, 2009

By:
'~ttorneyfdr Leishman Electric
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J.R. SIMPLOT CO., a Nevada
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)
)
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)

Plaintiff,

v.
HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, et al,

j

Defendants.

1

Civil Case No. 97-0490-E-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ANDORDER

)
)

The Court has before it Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs tort
claims. Oral argument was held on March 3. 1999, at the conclusion of which the Court
granted the motion. This Memorandum Decision is intended to supplemenf and explain the
Court's oral ling.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff J.R Simplot Company ("Simplot") operates the Smokey Canyon Mine in
Caribou County, Idaho Defendant Harnischfeger Corporal~onf"HarnischfegerV)
manufactures surface-mining equipment. In 1987 Sunplot purchased a Serles 1200B hydraulic
tninimg shovel ("the 1200B") from Harnischfeger for use at the Smokey Canyon Mine.
Some 10 years later, on April 3, 1997, the 1200B caught fire and was severely
damaged or destroyed. Its operator, Tommy Cynova, was not injured, and there was no
damage to any properly except the 1200B itself. For purposes of thls hearing, the Court
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assumes that the fire was interne and spread rapidly, such that it was simply a matter of luck
that Cynova escaped uninjured.
In addition to breach-of-contract claims, Simplol brings negligence and strict liability
claims against Harnischfeger seeking to recover for the damage lo the 1200B. Harnischfeger
has moved for summary judgment on all of Simplot's claims. The parties announced at oral
argument, however, that they had reached a stipulation to dismiss the breach-of-contract
claims. Finally, several other motions are pending, all of which involve Harnischfeger's
recent discovery of significant evidence regarding the fire-preventive features of the 1200B.

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact that would allow a judgment as a maner of law. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,256 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, see id. at 255, and the Court must not make credibility
determinations. See id. The Court must determine whether the evidence presented is such that
a jury applying the proper evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or
the defendant. See id.
Once the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict
in her favor. See id. at 256-57. In meeting this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond
the pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the deposilions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions on file* that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celocex Cop. v. Catren, 477

U.S. 317. 324 (1986).
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TORT CLAIMS

In Clark v. Internmional Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), the Idaho
Supreme Court established the "economic-loss rule," which prevents a purchaser of a product
from recovering in tor1 against the product's manufacnuer when the purchaser has sustained
purely economic losses. "Economic losses" include the "cosu of repair and replacement of
defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." E.g., Duffin v. Idaho Crop
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. I200 (1995) (citation and intern1

quotation omitted). The rationale for the economic-loss rule is that provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code "adequately define the rights of the parties" where purely economic losses
are at issue, and expanding tort law to address such losses "would only add more confusion in
an area already played with overlapping and conflicting theories of recovery." Clark, 99
Idaho at 336,581 P.2d at 794.
Because Simplot does not allege that the fire caused any personal injury or damage to
property other than the 1200B itself, application of the economic-loss rule would bar Siplot's
tort claims for damage to the 1200B. The rule, however, has three established exceptions: (1)
where economic loss is parasitic to personal injury or property damage; (2) where unique
circumstances require a different allocation of the risk; and (3) where the parties have a
"special relationship" such that the manufaclurer should have a duty to avoid economic loss to
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the purchaser. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. Simplot urges the creation
of a new exception for economic losses arising from a sudden or calamitous event.'
The parties agree that whether Simplot's economic losses are recoverable in tort is a
question of Idaho law. The Court is mindful that, when interpreting Idaho law, it is bound by
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. See Arizona EI@c. Power Coop., Inc. v. Berkeley, 59
F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1995). In the absence of a controlling decision, this Court must
predict how the Idaho Supreme Court would decide the question, "using intermediate appellate
court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as
guidance." Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Because the Idaho Supreme Court has
never addressed whether a "sudden or calamitous event" exception to the economic-loss rule
should be created, the Court must refer to such sources to predict how the Idaho Supreme
Court would resolve this question.
The Court first examines the Dugfin decision itself. The Duf/sn court listed the three
exceptions to the ecouomic-loss rule enumerated above using language suggesting that no
undiscovered exceptions exist. The decision does not employ a broad phrase like "the
exceptions to the rule include" before listing those three exceptions. Instead, it notes that the
rule has exceptions, states the "first" exception, states another exception, and "finally" states
the third exception. Duf/sn, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. This manner of

'To the extent S i p l o t argues that sudden and calamitous events, by their nature, fall
within one or more of these exceptions, the Court concludes that the Idaho Supreme Court
would not so hold. The Court reaches this conclusion for essentially for the same reasons it
will later conclude that the Idaho Supreme Court would not create a new exception for such
events.
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listillg the exceptions to the economic-loss rule suggests that the list was intended to be
exhaustive.
Simplot argues that a decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals implicitly recognizes the
"sudden and calamilous event" exception. That decision, Myers rr A. 0.Smith Harvestore

Prods., Inc., 114 Idaho 432,436, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988). contains the following
statement, made in the context of deciding to apply the economic-loss rnle to bar a tort claim
for damage to a product that malfunctioned in a less spectacular way than the 1200B is alleged
to have done: "[Tlhese injuries did not result from a calamitous event or dangerous failure of
the product. Rather, they arose from the failure of the product to match the buyers'
commercial expectations." While this statement suggests that the ldaho Court of Appeals
might have been receptive to creating the exception Simplot advocates, it is difftcult for the
Court to assign it significant weight. The statement is, at best, pure dictum. More precisely,
it is nothing more than an off-handed observation by the Court of Appeals about the facts
presented in that case. As such, it provides no guidance as to how receptive the ldaho
Supreme Court would be to the "sudden and calamitous event" exception urged by Simplot
under the facts of this case.
Simplot does, however, point to several jurisdictions that have created an exception
to the economic-loss mle for losses stemming from sudden or calamitous events. See Cloud v.

Kin, 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Gene CantreIl Drilling Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 571 F .
Supp. 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (applying Missouri law); Toucher Valley Grain Gravers, Inc. v.
Op & Seibold Gen. Consfr.,Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992); Mac's Eggs, Inc. v. Rite-Way

Agri Disfribs., 656 F. Supp. 722,730 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (applying Indiana law); Salt River
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Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz.

1984); Naional Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983); Russell v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383 (Or. 1978). These courts distinguish between "the

disappointed users...and the endangered ones." Russell, 575 P.2d at 1387. In other words,
they tend to view harm caused by a calamitous event as properly within the realm of tort law,
regardless of the existence of a contractual relationship between the product's manufacturer
and the person it harms.
These court represent the minority view. Interestingly enough, the United States
Supreme Court had the opportunity to air its views on this very issue in East River S.S. C o p .

v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (applying admiralty law), in which the
Court unanimously rejected the "sudden and calamitous event" exception. Citing "the need to
keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic
limitation on damages," the Court pronounced the minority view "unsatisfactory" and "too
indeterminate." Id. at 870-71. It held that "[elven when the harm to the product itself occurs
through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value,
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of his bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law." Id. at 870. Adopting the reasoning of Seely v.
. ,

'

White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (1965). the progenitor of the majority approach, the Court

elaborated:
"The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not
rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury
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The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products."
Seely v. Whire Motor Co., 63 Cal. Zd, at 18, 403 P.2d, at 151. When a product
injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for
leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.
Id. at 871.

It is difficult to regard a unanimous pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court
on the precise issue at hand as anything less than extremely persuasive. Easf River was
decided not by a fractured Court that was unemphatic in its holding, hul by one that thoroughly
reviewed the case law and policy rationales on both sides and then, with one voice,
wholeheartedly rejected the "sudden and calamitous event" exceplion. Although East River
has no binding effect on the Idaho Supreme Court, it strikes this Court as highly influential,
both because of the justices' unanimity and because of the quality of their reasoning.
Finally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes the economic-loss rule and
contains no "sudden and calamitous event" exception:
A...difficult question is presented when the defect in the product renders it
unreasonably dangerous, hut the product d~es.notc.au.seharm to persons or
property. In these situations the danger either (I) never eventuates in harm
because the product defect is discovered before it causes harm, or (2) eventuates
in harm to the product itself but not in harm to persons or other property. A
plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather than
merely ineffectual, should be governed by the rules governing products liability
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law. However, a majority of courts have concluded that the remedies provided
under the Uniform Commercial Code--repair and replacement costs and, in
appropriate circumstances, consequential economic loss--are sufficient. Thus,
the rules of this Restatement do not apply in such situations.
Restatement (Third) of Torts 8 21 cmt. d (1997).

Thus, the persuasiveness of East River, the fact that Emf River represents the majority
rule of American jurisdictions, the position taken by the Restaiement (Third) of Torts, and the
Idaho Supreme Court's longslanding adherence to the economic-loss rule and its previous
delimitation of the rule's nanow exceptions all combine to strongly suggest that the Idaho
Supreme Court would refuse to adopt a "sudden and calamitous event" exception to the
economic-loss rule. For this reason, Simplot has failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact that its claims are not barred by the economic-loss rule. Harnischfeger's motion for
summary judgment on those claims is granted.

CONTRACT CLAIMS
On January 29, 1999, Hamischfeger moved for summary judgment on the contract
claims stated in Count IV of Simplot's complaint. A few weeks later, on February 22. 1999,
Simplot filed a notice of its intent to seek voluntary dismissal of the contract claims. At oral
argument, the parties announced that they had reached a stipulation to dismiss Simplot's
contract claims, which they would soon be filing. The stipulation will provide for dismissal of
those claims with prejudice, with each party reserving its right to seek attorney fees, costs, and
sanctions as allowed hy ~ l e .
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The Court now grants the soon-to-be-filed stipulation. Simplot's contract claims are
dismissed with prejudice, and either party may seek attorney fees, costs, and sanctions upon
further application to the Court.
Having decided to grant summary judgment, the Court finds moot the remaining
motions, all of which involve Hamischfeger's newly changed position on a factual matter
irrelevant to the summary-judgment decision. Finally, because no claims remain for trial, this
case is closed.
ORDER
In accordance with the vicws expressed above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment--contract claims
(Docket No. 42) is MOOT in accordance with a soon-to-be-filed stipulation of the parties.
Plaintiffs contract claims are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to that stipulation, without
prejudice to the rights of either party to seek an award of attorney fees, costs, and sanctions, if
applicable, and upon further application to the Court in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment--tort
claims (Docket No. 33) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs tort claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tbat the remaining motions (Docket Nos. 31 and 38, parts
1.2, 3, and 4) are MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is CLOSED.
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